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Abstract
Aharonov and Anandan’s claim that the notion of “proper mixture” is improper
is shown to be unjustified. The point is made that if a purely operationalist stand-
point is taken the three difficulties these authors describe relatively to the conven-
tional interpretation of density matrices in fact vanish. It is noted that nevertheless
it is very difficult for us to do without any form of realism, in particular when the
quantum measurement problem is considered, and it is stressed that the proper
mixture notion comes in precisely at this level. The more general question of the
real bearing of Aharonov and Anandan’s ideas on the interpretation of quantum
mechanics problem is considered.
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1 Introduction
Aharonov and Anandan recently issued an article entitled Meaning of the Density
Matrix [1] in the main text of which the ideas of a certain physicist called d’Espagnet
are criticized. The first interesting question this paper raises is, of course: “Who is this
man ?”. Admittedly the idea occurred to me that, conceivably, he could be I. But there
were tokens of the contrary. The recurrent spelling mistake was admittedly but a minor
one. A more serious indication was the following. According to the text, this d’Espagnet
had tried to “point to the state of a physical system that is represented by ρ in the sense
that measurements on this state would give ρ”. Since the authors wrote this, I thought,
it must be true. And since personally I never made any such attempt (I do not even
understand the authors’ description of it...) Mr. d’Espagnet could not possibly be I.
Paradoxically, this (optimistic) impression of mine was enhanced by the fact that, in the
text, d’Espagnet is attributed by name a view actually shared, I believe, by, practically,
all quantum physicists, namely the idea that, |φα > and Nα being, respectively, the
normalized state vector describing an ensemble Eα of physical systems and the number of
elements in the latter (all systems being of the same type, and N = ΣαNα) the operator
ρ = Σα
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describes a mixture (incidentally, in the authors’ formula (4), here relabelled (1), the
symbol Σα is missing). The authors refer to some drawbacks they claim this view has
and, in fact, I have come to suspect that, at least in some parts of the article, this
d’Espagnet is just a convenient symbolic figure representing the large set of the physicists
who naively entertain the said view without even noticing its drawbacks. However I well
realize that this cannot be the whole story. After all, the name “d’Espagnat” is correctly
spelt in both the abstract and the references and... I did write the book entitled Veiled
Reality [2]! So I finally decided that I had to consider the substance of the problem raised.
It is the subject matter of this note.
One of my claims concerning it is that, in fact, this problem has much to do -
much more than is apparent at first sight - with the difficulty of setting a consistent
relationship between two notions, that of operational definition (of systems and their
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properties) and that of ontological existence. Hence, in Section 2 the point is made that if
a purely operationalist standpoint is taken the three difficulties Aharonov and Anandan’
Introduction describes in fact vanish. In Section 3 it is noted that nevertheless it is
very difficult for us to do without any form of realism, in particular when the quantum
measurement problem is considered, but that difficulties then creep in; and it is shown
that, in this field at least, contrary to Aharonov and Anandan’s claim, the notion of proper
mixtures is justified. In Section 4 the more general question of the bearing of Aharonov
and Anandan’s ideas is investigated and in Section 5 some conclusions are drawn.
2 On the virtues of unaltered operationalism
The necessity of only using concepts having a well defined meaning prompts us to
systematically use operational definitions but we have a natural trend towards realism
and in quantum physics reconciling the two is not always easy. One possible standpoint is
to resist this “ontological” trend and take but the operational aspects of quantum physics
seriously. It is then considered that quantum mechanics is merely a set of rules correctly
predicting what the outcomes of measurements will be. Since some of these rules only yield
probabilities we have to consider ensembles. But it must be observed that, to repeat, the
standpoint in question removes at one stroke the three drawbacks to the use of ensembles
that Aharonov and Anandan mention in their Introduction. This is obvious concerning
drawback (1). It is also clear concerning drawback (2) since within this standpoint ρ is but
a predictive tool. That a predictive tool should change abruptly when new information is
gathered is quite natural and does not constitute a conceptual problem. And drawback
(3) vanishes as well since within the said standpoint introducing the ensemble in question
- a Gibbsian one, that is, an abstract concept - only serves to give a meaning to the
probabilities of getting such and such measurement results. The formalism simply does
not include the rule that the result obtained in one measurement should be relevant for
predicting the probabilities of further measurement outcomes. Rather, it stipulates that
to this end a new Gibbsian ensemble corresponding to ρ should be imagined afresh.
3
3 Charms and Dangers of Realism. Proper
mixtures
The above conclusion is clear and, I think, uncontroversial. Wherefrom does it
then come that Aharonov and Anandan found the conventional meaning given to density
matrices has the drawbacks they state? This question admits of but one answer. It is
because just as all “normal” people, they do not strictly cling to “pure operationalism and
nothing more”. Implicitly or not, they instill in their views some admixture of realism.
This, of course, is fully rational and understandable. To appreciate how natural it is
the best way is to consider a problem different from theirs, namely the quantum measure-
ment problem. Suppose we have to do with an ensemble of generalized, Schro¨dinger-cat-
like measurements, made with instruments having scales with µ intervals and taking place
before time t. If we want to strictly remain within the realm of a purely operationalistic
description we must be very cautious concerning the way we describe the state of affairs
after time t. We must do this just by stating that if we look at the pointers after that
time we shall get the “feeling” that some of them lie in scale interval 1, some of them lie
in scale interval 2 etc., the corresponding proportions being derivable from knowledge of
the pointer ensemble density matrix (obtained by partial tracing from the density matrix
of the overall ensemble of systems plus instruments). In a “strictly scientific” sense this
information incorporates everything that we need to know. A more “realistic” descrip-
tion of the pointers, supposing that it can be given, would add nothing to our predictive
powers concerning the phenomenon of interest. But still, most people find it very dif-
ficult to believe that this operational description is the “whole story”. Quite naturally
they would like to be able to interpret the ensemble E of all the pointers “realistically”,
that is, as composed of µ subensembles E1, · · · , Eα, · · · , Eµ, the components of each Eα
being pointers really lying in one definite interval, the one labelled α. This shows that,
at least in some situations, it is hardly possible to resist our natural inclination towards
the philosophical standpoint called realism. What differentiates this realistic description
from the foregoing, purely operational one is that we now consider that on every member
of each Eα the result of measuring in which interval it lies is predetermined. This as-
sumption cannot be translated in a purely operationalistic language since it is impossible
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to operationally ascertain it. To be sure we can measure in what interval this pointer is
but nothing proves that it is not this very measurement act that sets it in this interval.
Nevertheless the realist considers the assumption in question as meaningful an he finds it
so natural that he deems it to be correct.
But then, as is well known, a problem arises. As soon as, following most of the
theorists who tried to build up quantum measurement theories, we decide to describe
quantum mechanically - that is, either by state-vectors or by density matrices - each one of
these Eα “as it really is” (i.e. taking into account the fact that each one of its components
is in scale interval α and nowhere else), we automatically get that since E must be the
addition of all the Eα, it is of the nature of what, by definition, I called a “proper mixture”,
describable by a ρ of the form (1) or a trivial generalization thereof. This simply follows
from the fact that, obviouly, under the conditions stated the quantum description of any
one of these Eα must differ from those of the others. Note that this conclusion is of a
general nature: the observation that macroscopic systems such as pointers are not isolated
from the environment does not alter it since we can, by thought, incorporate environment
within the system. For completeness sake let it here be briefly recalled that the conclusion
in question may be viewed as being at the source of the “measurement problem”, that,
within conventional realism, the problem in question has no satisfactory solution, and that
this is considered by some as compelling us to give up the said realism. This analysis,
however, fall outside our present subject.
Concerning the present debate two points, I think, emerge from the above. One
is that physicists should more thoroughly investigate what they intuitively mean when
they, explicitly or implicitly, deal with realistic notions. Let this question be deferred to
Section 4. The other point is that, at least as it is used in my book Veiled Reality [2],
the notion of “proper mixture” is not in the least “improper”, contrary to Aharonov and
Anandan’s claim. The reason is that, as explained in Remark 5, Section 7.3 of Veiled
Reality, the chapters of this book that Aharonov and Anandan refer to were written just
for the purpose of making clear the difficulty realism leads to. The whole argumentation
in these chapters is, in this respect, negative. In substance, it amounts to exclaim: “Look
here: in general ensembles produced this way are not proper mixtures. You cannot think
of them as you would think of balls distributed among different vessels”. Considered in
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this light, that is, as essentially linked to an interpretation problem - and more precisely
to attempts at building up an interpretation couched in realist, or “classical”, terms - the
notion of proper mixture far from being “improper” is trivial. It is no more improper
that the just introduced notion of balls distributed among different vessels.
Let us turn, then, to Aharonov and Anandan’s objections. First of all, it is true, of
course, that picking up one ball in one definite vessel changes the probabilities concerning
further pickings that might be done. But then what ? Does this make the notion of
“balls distributed among vessels” inconsistent, illogical, “improper”? Obviously not. The
same holds true here. What must be stressed in this respect is that the notion of balls
distributed among vessels (or pointers distributed among scale intervals) is one that we,
originally, have; that, as we saw, we intuitively tend to use it, at least in some instances,
for giving a realistic meaning to partial trace density matrices; and that, therefore, it
was necessary to show that it is not, in general, appropriate for this purpose. Otherwise
said, Aharonov and Anandan’s remark about the “memory” of proper mixtures is correct
but irrelevant. It does not constitute an objection to the concept of such mixtures since,
as shown above, the concept in question is necessary for discussing interpretations of
quantum measurement theories that seem natural, not to say “obvious”.
Hence their objection must boil down to one of a semantical nature; one of the
type: “the concept d’Espagnet calls ‘proper mixture’ is a valid one but the ensemble it
refers to are not mixtures”. Since names always are, to some extent, conventional such
semantical discussions are not, as a rule, of much interest. But anyhow, my opinion on
this is that the arguments in favor of calling such ensemble “mixtures” are at least as
cogent as those for abstaining of doing so. One of them is, of course, that the word
“mixture” is an element of our commonsense, everyday language and that, conceptually,
proper mixtures are considerably more similar to such “everyday life” mixtures than are
the mixtures I call “improper” (that is, the ones for which Aharonov and Anandan insist
on saving up the word ‘mixture’). Another and even more significant argument is that, for
all purely operational purposes such as those described here in Section 2, proper mixtures
can be described by density matrices, that is, are indistinguishable from the ensembles
for which Aharonov and Anandan save up the word presently under discussion (indeed,
it is only when ‘proper’ mixtures are given some kind of an ontological interpretation,
as collections of physical systems, that differences with ‘improper’ mixtures appear, see
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below and Ref. [2]).
As for the other criticisms that Aharonov and Anandan try to develop in their
Section 4, I think they are unsubstantial as well. In the paragraph in which these authors
let N tend to infinity they observe that the density matrix (1) cannot be any one of
“this sequence”. Unfortunately, in their wording it is not clear what the expression “this
sequence” actually means. They also observe, as previously noted, that so long as only
usual measurements are performed on the system “we cannot point to the state of a
physical system that is represented by ρ in the sense that measurements on this state
would give ρ”. But in what sense is this a criticism ? It seems that Aharonov and
Anandan have here in mind their own view that a density matrix should be attached to
a single system, not realizing that it is not necessarily the view other physicists have in
mind.
By contrast, their analysis of the differences I had noted between differently pre-
pared proper mixtures described by the same density matrix is basically sound. In subs-
tance, however, it is a mere rewording of what I had already stated in Section 8.3 of
Ref. [2]. The points I made there were (i) that the argument “these two mixtures are dif-
ferent since they have been produced differently” is not a universally convincing one; (ii)
that while observable differences (the ones Aharonov and Anandan mention) can indeed
be produced between these mixtures, the differences in question are actually observable -
hence significant - only if these “ensembles” are treated as what, after all, they physically
are, that is, as systems of (noninteracting) particles; and finally (iii) that concerning the
question whether or not we can define a state by means of a non-pure-case density matrix
the answer is yes but only at a (heavy) price. This price, as I explained there, consists
in deciding that the ensemble concerning which quantum mechanics yields predictions
(concerning nonprotective measurement results, of course!) are essentially abstract cons-
tructs, very useful indeed for predicting observation outcomes but not to be considered
as composite physical systems (i.e. not to be considered as one would like to consider
ensembles of, e.g., pointers, see above). And, correlatively, that - at least in quantum
measurement theory - the notion “state” is but a predictive concept.
At first sight this last point seems to contradict Aharonov and Anandan’s views
since these authors consider with favor the concept of an “objective reality that could be
described by the density matrix”. It is clear, however, that in their approach such an
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objective reality is defined only relatively to protective measurements, and it remains to
be seen whether and to what extent such a partial definition of reality is truly satisfactory.
This is the purpose of the next section.
As a last remark concerning proper mixtures let me stress once more that, at the
start, two very general standpoints are conceivable, namely (i) the purely operational,
purely predictive one and (ii) the descriptive, tentatively realistic one. A priori either one
of these two standpoints is worth consideration but we have to choose between them. If
we choose the first one, or if our investigations lead us to consider that it is the only a
posteriori tenable one, then it is clear from the above that there is no point in considering
proper mixtures. But if we choose the second one - or before we have finally discovered this
second one is untenable - I cannot really see why a general notion of proper mixtures (not
restricted to objects we would like to think of as classical) should be an inconsistent one.
The point is that within this second standpoint we cannot cling to the rule - call it Rule
R - that by definition two systems or ensemble of systems that cannot be distinguished
from one another by any measurement are, by definition, identical. This rule R is specific
to standpoint (i). If, in the spirit of standpoint (ii), we impart by thought some reality
to the quantum states there is then no reason why we should not consider ensembles of
systems of the same type lying in different quantum states. As we saw above on the
particular example of pointers, there are cogent reasons to describe such ensembles by
density matrices such as (1) and call them mixtures. And it is easily seen that those of
the objections raised by Aharonov and Anandan that are valid can be disproved, just by
observing that, implicitly, they are based on Rule R and that, in standpoint (ii), Rule R
is not present.
4 Invariants and Reality
As we saw in Section 2, it is a fact that the purely operational standpoint works. On
the other hand, as pointed out in Section 3, it is also a fact that most people are expecting
more from physics. Indeed, many of us consider that the real purpose of physics is to
describe in detail the physical world as it really is. And the very wording of quantum
physics - with such terms as “particle” and “state” - illustrates how powerful this ideal
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is. Needless to say, it is a respectable one. It motivates most of the inquiries concerning
interpretation of quantum physics and in particular the tentative quantum measurement
theories. Concerning wave functions and density matrices it explicitly constitutes the
substance of Aharonov and Anandan’s aim. In my view the ideal in question (call it, say,
the “realist” one) is not to be dismissed on the basis of purely philosophical arguments.
Indeed, it is one that, in the high times of classical physics, was considered by most scien-
tists as being very much within reach and it is reasonable that contemporary physicists
with such a realist turn of mind should do their best to preserve it. However, in Section 3
we also touched upon several points that have been quite extensively developed by many
authors (see e.g.[2]) and show that, when the phenomenon of quantum measurements is
duly taken into account, the ideal in question generates considerable difficulties. Hence
the question really arises: the quantum formalism being what it is, is it actually possible
to salvage, within it, at least the main elements of a “normal kind” of realism? This, to
repeat, is the aim not only of the many authors of quantum measurement theories but
also, as it seems, that of Aharonov and Anandan as well.
To study this question it is appropriate to proceed more or less as philosophers
would. When discussing such matters, philosophers use to begin by introducing the
notion of invariants, a substantive referring to invariance with respect to varied modes
of apprehension and/or description. In ordinary life we have - they note - visual etc.
impressions that change when we move around: but our mind is able to build up the
notion of a set of things and properties of things (such as shape, color etc.) that, we posit,
do not really change under these conditions; that are “invariants” with respect to them.
Correlatively - they go on noting - our mind spontaneously builds up a theoretical model
making it possible to consistently explain its impressions by referring to the invariants in
question. And, they claim, it is such invariants that, in ordinary life, we call real. Note
in this respect that, in this context, “to call” is more than just to introduce a semantical
convention. To call these invariants real means hypostatizing them to a kind of special
level. It means instinctively attributing to them an “absoluteness” that, as we already
noted, cannot be defined operationally (I mean: noncounterfactually) but that somehow
makes them differ from a host of other concepts, taste, equations, probablities, etc. that
are not viewed as “physically real”.
Hypostatizing concepts goes together with hypostatizing the models that are based
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on them. We then say, or would like to say, that the models in question are true descrip-
tions of the World as it really is. At this stage, however, an important point must be
stressed. It is that this whole hypostatizing procedure is really satisfactory only if the
validity of the hypostatized concepts and model is not limited to the description of phe-
nomena taking place within some limited experimental context. For further reference let
us call this condition, Condition A. When classical physics was in its apex Condition A
seemed to be met. The World then appeared as composed of particles and fields and
the nature of each one of these constituents could be specified quite independently of
the particular phenomenon or experimental procedure the physicists choosed to discuss.
In other words, the corresponding invariants were totally noncontextualistic. It was not
necessary to strictly associate any one of them with some restricted class of impressions.
In that sense, they could be termed universal.
If we set aside the so called “ontologically interpretable models” such as the Broglie-
Bohm model - which raise difficult problems of their own, would call for a separate dis-
cussion (see e.g.[2]) and lie anyhow outside the realm of the present debate - we must
ackowledge that the advent of quantum theory dramatically altered the above picture.
Within Bohr’s approach, for example, complementarity means that the validity of any one
of the ordinary language invariants is, in the microscopic domain, limited to the descrip-
tion of phenomena taking place within some well-defined experimental context, that is, to
a restricted class of observables. In other words, these invariants do not meet Condition
A.
Did more recent advances in the field substantially modify the situation? I do not
think so. Take, say, the concepts of events and histories. It is true that the theories of
Griffiths, Gell-Mann and Hartle and Omne`s partly succeeded in restoring the meaningful-
ness of these notions within the microscopic domain. It is true that, for example, within
a given consistent history branch an event is, in these theories, independent in principle
of whether it is observed or not that is, it qualifies for being considered as an invariant in
this respect. However, it is not an invariant with respect to the adjunction - or, better to
say, the “taking into account” - of some possible future events. In other words, it is an
invariant only with respect to quite a limited class of possible experimental procedures:
a class that is very far from incorporating all the experimental procedures that are easily
available. Hence it is impossible to hypostatize it to the level of an element of reality as
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classical realists did concerning the invariants they thought were universal. It does not
fulfill Condition A.
Now, since this article is motivated by the Aharonov and Anandan paper, it is
worthwhile to point out that, same as in the foregoing example, the Aharonov and Anan-
dan concepts of wave functions and density matrices attached to one system only are,
as stressed for example by Bitbol [3, 4], merely partial invariants. They are invariant
with respect to protective measurements but only with respect to them. Hence the above
conclusion also holds good concerning them. These invariants do not fulfill Condition A.
Admittedly we may, if we like, take up the convention of calling them real. Viewed as a
mere convention this one may be useful (see below). On the other hand, since protective
measurements constitute a highly limited class of possible experimental procedures, when
trying to predict ordinary measurement outcomes we shall obviously continue being in
need of considering probabilities, statistical ensembles and so on. In this domain, density
matrices attached to one system only will be of no help. Willy-nilly we shall have to go
on interpreting them as referring to the ensembles in question.
5 Conclusion
There is no doubt that the protective measurements concept and the possibility it
yields of - in some conceptual contexts - interpreting density matrices as descriptions of
one system “states” are quite interesting indeed. This is shown for example by the content
of Section 3 of Aharonov and Anandan’s paper. Of course, we have known for a long time
that as long as we decided to forget about such things as the measurement problem and
the Born probability rule, the remaining quantum rules could be stated as genuine physical
laws, that is, without referring to human actions and observations: otherwise said, in a
strongly objective language parallelling the strongly objective language of classical physics.
With this proviso we could say: “there exist wave functions and/or density matrices that
have such and such properties, obey such and such equations etc.”, much as had been
done in classical physics concerning material objects and fields. But there remained the
difference that in classical physics the entities thus said to exist (positions of objects,
field strengths etc.) could also be measured, a circumstance that contributed very much
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to remove any suspicion that their postulated existence was “unwarranted metaphysics”.
This is a difference that the new ideas brought in by Aharonov and Anandan remove. And
in this sense it must be granted that these ideas do bring quantum mechanics somewhat
closer to a realistic world view that many physicists consider as being the only acceptable
one.
But on the other hand we should keep in mind that all this holds good only as long
as the proviso is accepted of forgetting about the measurement problem while, of course,
we cannot really forget about it. It is a fact that the great majority of the measurement
we perform are not “protective” ones, that they yield definite values according to definite
probability laws etc.. and it seems clear that, as stressed at the end of the foregoing sec-
tion, the existence of these effects will oblige us to continue using probabilities, ensembles
and density matrices in the usual way. Now, in this field all the analyses that have been
made, along the years, of the quantum mechanical rules and the measurement problem
(including the fact that improper ensembles are not to be identified with proper ones!)
remain valid. All taken together, they show that the strongly objective language of the
main parts of classical physics cannot be consistently used in quantum physics. Finally
therefore, as shown in [2], quantum physics as a whole can only be expressed in a weakly
objective language, in which objectivity is identified with universal intersubjectivity.
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